Classification: OBSERVED application-log sequence plus a USER-REPORTED relationship; causal root remains UNKNOWN.
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A plan change was reported around a period when OpenCode sessions stopped authenticating. The logs support a scoped account of the sequence, not a conclusion that the plan change caused the invalidations.
What the redacted logs show
- Two OpenCode sessions contained authentication-invalidated events.
- Four redacted
AUTH_INVALIDATEDlog rows were identified. - The interval from the first logged failure to auth-store refresh was 383.69 seconds (about 6.39 minutes).
- No shared backend restart was observed in that diagnosis.
- After refresh, one session had provider-stream events and the other had none; an accepted job outcome was not established from these logs.
A separate KD11 Bridge snapshot had zero local auth-related Bridge events at its capture point. That is a different instrument and coverage scope; it does not contradict the application logs or establish account-wide activity.
What remains unknown
The causal mechanism, exact human reauthentication time, whether either interrupted job completed, prior-plan identity, and account-wide use through other clients are not established. “After” and “around the same time” are not proof of “because of.” No session IDs, credentials or private tokens are published here.
Recovery lessons supported by the scope
Keep authentication recovery separate from resource waiting. Preserve the job checkpoint before refreshing credentials, identify the last verified stage, then inspect the prior attempt before resuming. An auth-store refresh is not proof that the original job resumed; the verifier must establish that separately.
The Agent Operating Rules Builder includes distinct auth, checkpoint and ambiguous-retry safeguards. The stalled-canary observation covers progress signals without asserting this incident’s root cause.